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Statement of Jurisdiction 
This is an interlocutory appeal brought by appellant Alma 
DeMar Egbert from an order entered by the district court denying 
Egbert's motion for a new preliminary hearing. Egbert made the 
motion when his trial counsel discovered that no record had been 
preserved of the original preliminary hearing. The appeal is 
brought under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l) (c) . Egbert was 
charged in an amended information with a number of second and 
third degree felonies alleging various white collar offenses. 
The Utah Court of Appeals invokes appellate jurisdiction over 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (d) . 
Statement of the Issue and Standard of Review 
Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant Egbert's 
motion for a new preliminary hearing after the record of the 
original preliminary hearing was lost or destroyed. (R. 223, 
266-67) Prior decisions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
do not provide a clear standard of review when a trial court 
denies a motion for a new preliminary hearing under the 
circumstances presented in this appeal. Faced with the same 
question in Harris v. District Court of City and County of 
Denver, 843 P.2d 1316, 1320 (Colo. 1993), the Colorado Supreme 
Court reviewed the issue under an abuse of discretion standard. 
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Relevant Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules 
Utah Const. Art. I., § 13. 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, 
shall be prosecuted by information after examination and 
commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by 
the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with 
or without such examination and commitment. 
Utah Const. Art. I., § 12. (in pertinent part) 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing is this constitution shall preclude 
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or 
rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
U.R.Cr.P. 7. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MAGISTRATE 
* * * * 
(g)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the 
defendant shall be advised of the right to a preliminary 
examination. If the defendant waives the right to a preliminary 
examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the 
magistrate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the 
district court. 
(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary 
examination, the magistrate shall schedule the preliminary 
examination. The examination shall be held within a reasonable 
time, but not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody 
for the offense charged and not later than 30 days if the 
defendant is not in custody. These time periods may be extended 
by the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary 
examination may not be held if the defendant is indicted. 
(h)(1) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination 
shall be held under the rules and laws applicable to criminal 
cases tried before a court. The state has the burden of proof 
and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the 
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state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call 
witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also 
cross-examine adverse witnesses. 
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause 
to believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the 
defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall order, in 
writing, that the defendant be bound over to answer in the 
district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on 
hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the 
ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly 
raised at the preliminary examination. 
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to 
believe that the crime charged has been committed or that the 
defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the 
information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may 
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of 
dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state 
from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 
(i) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon 
request of either party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom 
and may require witnesses not to converse with each other until 
the preliminary examination is concluded. On the request of 
either party, the magistrate may order all spectators to be 
excluded from the courtroom. 
(j)(1) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to 
the district court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a 
bind-over order and shall transmit to the clerk of the district 
court all pleadings in and records made of the proceedings before 
the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any 
typewritten transcript. 
• * * • 
Statement of the Case 
Alma DeMar Egbert was charged in a seventeen count amended 
indictment charging unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary, 
securities fraud, communications fraud, and pattern of unlawful 
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activity. All of the charged offenses allegedly occurred between 
1992 and 1996. (R. 45-52) This is an interlocutory appeal 
brought by permission of this Court to determine whether the 
district court erred when it denied Egbert's motion for a new 
preliminary hearing. The motion was made after Egbert's counsel 
learned that the record of the preliminary hearing previously 
conducted by the district court had been lost or destroyed. 
Statement of the Facts 
On April 30, 1998, Judge Robert Hilder conducted a 
preliminary hearing to determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support the charges in the information. (R. 53-54) 
Thereafter, Judge Hilder ordered that Egbert be bound-over on all 
charges except counts I, II, III, and VIII, which were dismissed 
pursuant to the state's motion. (R. 90) The case was assigned 
to Judge Anthony Quinn for trial. 
Sometime later, Egbert' counsel learned that the tape of the 
preliminary examination conducted by Judge Hilder had been lost 
or destroyed and absolutely no record of that hearing remained. 
Accordingly, on or about June 20, 2000, Egbert filed a motion for 
a new preliminary hearing and a memorandum in support of the 
motion. (R. 223-25) The state filed a memorandum in opposition 
to the motion (R. 238), and Judge Quinn heard argument on July 
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10, 2000. Judge Quinn concluded that loss of the preliminary 
hearing record did not rise to the level of a constitutional 
violation and he denied Egbert's motion for a new hearing. (R. 
266; Trans, at 10) 
Summary of the Argument 
If the state files a felony charge against an accused by 
information instead of indictment, Article I, Section 13 of the 
Utah Constitution provides the accused with a right to a 
preliminary hearing. Incident to that right is the right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing, the right to confront 
witnesses, and the right to cross-examine the state's witnesses. 
Because a preliminary hearing is a "critical stage" in the 
criminal process, the loss or destruction of the record of the 
preliminary hearing is of such detriment to the accused for use 
in trial preparation (including the filing of pre-trial motions 
such as a direct challenge to the bind over order in a motion to 
quash) that the Utah Constitution mandates that upon request a 
new preliminary hearing must be conducted. 
Argument 
The district court erred in denying Egbert's motion for 
a new preliminary hearing when the transcript of the 
original preliminary hearing was lost or destroyed. 
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Under article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution an 
accused has a right to a preliminary examination when the state 
proceeds by information instead of indictment. When a 
preliminary hearing is conducted, and the record of the hearing 
is either lost or destroyed, the constitutional right to a 
preliminary hearing is so compromised that a new hearing must be 
provided. Where there is no record, there was no proceeding. 
The Utah Supreme Court has never disavowed its statement in 
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 784 (Utah 1980), that an 
important ancillary purpose of a preliminary hearing is to 
provide the accused with "a discovery device in which the 
defendant is not only informed of the nature of the State's case 
against him, but is provided a means by which he can discover and 
preserve favorable evidence."1 
1
 In 1994, Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
was amended with the following language: 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a 
preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. 
Nothing is this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding 
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
It is well-known that the purpose of the amendment was to clarify 
the probable cause function of a preliminary hearing in order to 
provide a basis permitting use of hearsay evidence. A year after 
the amendment, the Utah Supreme Court again repeated the 
ancillary purposes of preliminary hearings in the criminal 
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The Anderson court observed that "[the discovery available 
at the preliminary hearing represents an important step in the 
preparation of the defendant's defense for the subsequent trial. 
The opportunity to prepare an effective defense is recognized as 
essential to the preservation of the defendant's substantive 
right to a fair trial. Thus, here again, effectuation of the 
ancillary purposes of the preliminary hearing mandates the 
application of certain procedural safeguards to the hearing 
itself/' Id. (footnotes omitted). The court also noted with 
approval that in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.C. 1999, 
2003 (1969), the United States Supreme Court recognized the 
"critical" character of preliminary hearings under Alabama state 
law. Id. at 785. Moreover, relying on the reasoning in Coleman, 
the Utah Supreme Court has also designated a preliminary hearing 
as a "critical stage" in the criminal process. State v. Brickev, 
714 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986). 
There is no Utah case exactly on point. However, of 
persuasive value to this analysis is Harris v. District Court of 
Citv and County of Denver, 843 P.2d 1316 (Colo. 1993). In 
process. State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218, 222 (Utah 1995). Four 
years after the amendment, the supreme court maintained this 
approach in State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435,438 (Utah 1998): "The 
preliminary hearing acts as a discovery device advising the 
accused of the details of the charges and preserving favorable 
evidence." 
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Harris, the significant portions of the preliminary hearing could 
not be transcribed. The trial court denied the defendant's 
motion for a new preliminary hearing. The defendant then filed 
"an original proceeding" (i.e., a petition for writ of mandamus) 
in the Colorado Supreme Court. The court in Harris first noted 
that in Colorado M[a] preliminary hearing is designed to provide 
judicial determination that probable cause exists to bind an 
accused over for trial. . . . We have emphasized that a 
preliminary hearing is not intended to be a mini-trial or to 
afford the defendant an opportunity to effect discovery." Id. at 
1319. 
However, the Harris court acknowledged the important 
function of a preliminary hearing beyond a probable cause 
determination: "In addition to providing judicially enforced 
safeguards to prevent unlawful detentions and unwarranted trials, 
a preliminary hearing provides a defendant several benefits which 
may be helpful at trial." Id. The court then relied on Coleman 
in support of the proposition that a complete transcript is vital 
to a defendant in preparing a defense: 
In Coleman v. Alabama, . . . the Supreme Court 
recognized that the preliminary hearing provided by an 
Alabama statute afforded a defendant with opportunities 
to acquire a vital impeachment tool for subsequent use 
in cross-examining prosecution witnesses at trial, to 
preserve favorable testimony of witnesses who do not 
appear at the subsequent trial, and to discover the 
prosecution's case and thus to make possible the 
preparation of a proper defense. . . . These benefits 
are useless, however, if the absence of an accurate and 
complete transcript of essential portions of a 
preliminary hearing. 
Id.2 
Accordingly, while reiterating that a preliminary hearing is 
not a discovery proceeding, the Harris court explained that 
because defendants in criminal cases are not able to 
take discovery depositions of prosecution witnesses,[] 
and prosecution witnesses need not discuss their 
testimony in advance with defense counsel, the 
preliminary hearing takes on added significance in the 
total spectrum of criminal adjudication. 
Id. at 1320. The court held that the trial court's denial of the 
motion for a new preliminary hearing constituted an abuse of 
discretion and ordered a new hearing on remand. Id. 
In the memorandum in opposition to the motion for a new 
preliminary hearing the state blithely made the argument that a 
new hearing was unnecessary because all of the witnesses who 
testified at the hearing were "but a phone call away". (R. 239) 
Of course, investigative tools deemed adequate for the accused 
(i.e., a telephone) are not sufficient investigative methods for 
the state. The concept of the level playing field in criminal 
cases is, unfortunately, a profound myth. When, during a 
2
 The court in Harris then explained that in a prior case 
it held that the district court had abused its discretion in 
denying a complete preliminary hearing transcript to an indigent 
defendant. 843 P.2d at 1319 (citing Gonzales v. District Court, 
602 P.2d 857 (Colo. 1979) . 
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criminal investigation, a witness refuses to speak to a state 
investigator, the state has the power to compel the sworn 
testimony of the witness. A prosecutor may "compel [a witness'] 
attendance and testimony under oath to be recorded by a suitable 
electronic recording device or to be given before any certified 
court reporter." Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2(3) (a) (ii).3 The 
accused in a criminal case enjoys no such reciprocal right of 
discovery. Use of depositions in criminal cases are limited to 
circumstances outlined in Rule 14(h) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Under that rule, depositions are only 
permitted when a material witness will not be available for 
trial/ and the deposition can only proceed by order of the trial 
court upon application. 
By not permitting a new preliminary hearing upon loss of the 
record of the original preliminary hearing, certain appellate 
remedies would be lost to both sides. For example, in State v. 
Hester, 3 P.3d 725 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), the state appealed from 
a magistrate's dismissal after preliminary hearing. In that 
case, the magistrate concluded that the evidence did not support 
the drug charge on the state's constructive possession theory, 
but that the evidence did support the theft charge. The state 
3
 The title of the chapter is Subpoena Powers for Aid of 
Criminal Investigation and Grants of Immunity. 
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brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the ruling on the 
drug charge. I 
Assume that in Hester the record of the preliminary hearing 
had been lost or destroyed through no fault of the parties. 
Unless the magistrate had made undisputed written factual 
findings (a very unlikely scenario), the statutory appellate 
remedy would have been foreclosed to the state since the 
appellate court would have had no factual record with which to 
determine error. Likewise, upon loss or destruction of the 
preliminary hearing record, the accused cannot challenge, in any 
meaningful way, the bind over order in front of the judge to whom 
the case is assigned for trial. The problem becomes further 
complicated when the accused argues, after bind over, that the 
facts at the preliminary hearing, even if true, did not 
demonstrate the commission of crime. Again, without a 
stipulation from the state regarding the facts allegedly 
i 
supporting the charge, the trial court would have no way of 
ruling on the motion to quash. It would be wholly arbitrary and 
fundamentally unfair to conclude that a new preliminary hearing 
is justified upon the state's request, but not upon motion of the 
accused. 
Egbert anticipates that the state may rely upon State v. 
Willett, 909 P.2d 218 (Utah 1995), in support of its position 
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that a new preliminary hearing was not mandated. In Willett, a 
capital murder case, a preliminary hearing was conducted in 1983. 
Willett then entered a guilty plea, the plea was subsequently 
withdrawn, and the case was tried to a jury in 1994. As Willett 
prepared for trial, it was discovered that the transcript from 
the second day of the preliminary hearing had been lost or 
destroyed. The court in Willett held that it was not error to 
deny the request for a new preliminary hearing. Id. at 221-22. 
The opinion relies on a procedural error in the briefing and does 
not address the issue on the substantive merits. The court 
observed that Willett did not cite to the record in support of 
his argument, and hence the court declined to analyze the issue 
any further. Id. Moreover, in a footnote, the court also 
explained that during the second day of the preliminary hearing 
only defense witnesses testified. Id. at 222 n.2. Accordingly, 
Willett had everything he needed to cross-examine the state's 
witnesses at trial. His constitutional right to confront was not 
jeopardized in any respect. 
A useful analogy might be the loss or destruction of a 
deposition transcript taken in civil discovery. Consider that a 
deposition is taken, and unbeknownst to the reporter the 
transcribing machine malfunctions. The party taking the 
deposition requests another deposition of the witness, and the 
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district court denies the request. The argument could be made 
that the party taking the deposition has not lost anything 
because the witness can still be called at trial. Nevertheless, 
the record of the testimony is gone not only for impeachment at 
trial but, more substantively, for purposes of dispositive 
pretrial motions that may put an end to the litigation. The 
record created at a preliminary hearing in a criminal case is 
used in much the same way, not only to support motions to dismiss 
but other important pretrial motions such as motions to suppress, 
motions for severance, and the like. 
Since a preliminary hearing is in fact a "critical stage" in 
the criminal process with substantive and procedural protections 
afforded to the accused, and because the legislature has created 
certain important statutory remedies to address the outcome of 
preliminary hearings, this Court should conclude that a record of 
the preliminary hearing (unless waived) is a necessary precedent 
to the continuation of a criminal case toward trial. As such, the 
hearing must be a matter of record and loss or destruction of the 
record constitutes the loss of the right to the hearing. A 
contrary ruling would tacitly approve of careless procedures by 
district courts in the creation and maintenance of record 
evidence in court proceedings. 
13 
Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, Egbert requests 
this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion for 
a new preliminary hearing and order that a new preliminary 
hearing be conducted. 
DATED: February / ^ , 2001. 
2UC/ 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
MICHAEL R. SIKORA 
Lawyers for Appellant 
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15 
ADDENDUM 
1. Order Denying Defendant's Motion for New 
Preliminary Hearing 
2. Petition for Permission to Appeal from an 
Interlocutory Order 
DAVID BIGGS (0321) 
ANDREA J. GARLAND (7205) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
FILE* DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 1 3 2000 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
<*<•. Deputy Cleric 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v-
ALMA EGBERT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR NEW PRELIMINARY 
HEARING 
Case No. 971009224 
JUDGE QUINN 
A hearing was held on this matter on July 10, 2000. The State was present and 
represented by Howie Lemke. Defendant was not present but was represented by Andrea J. 
Garland. The Court heard argument from both parties concerning defendant's motion for a 
new preliminary hearing. Defense motion for new preliminary hearing due to court's failure to 
provide any record of the prior preliminary hearing is denied. 
Dated this y g day of July, 2000. 
BY THE COUR 
DAVID C. BIGGS (0321) 
ANDREA J. GARLAND (7205) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO 
: APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY 
: ORDER 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
ALMA DEMAR EGBERT, : Trial Court No. 971009224FS 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
NATURE OF THE INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
Defendant/Petitioner Alma Demar Egbert, by and through counsel, David C. Biggs and 
Andrea J. Garland, petitions this Court pursuant to Ut. R. App. P. 5 to permit an appeal from the 
interlocutory order of the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn entered in this matter on July 13, 2000. 
The order being appealed denies Petitioner's motion for a new preliminary hearing. The 
recording and/or transcript of the original preliminary hearing held in this case were either lost or 
destroyed sometime prior to Petitioner's present counsel being appointed to this case. A copy of 
the order sought to be reviewed is attached as Addendum A. 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court commit prejudicial error by denying Petitioner's motion for a new 
preliminary hearing when Petitioner is entitled to a new preliminary hearing pursuant to Article 
1, § § 12 and 13 of the Utah Constitution? 
Standard of Review: Generally, an appellate court reviews a trial court's determination of 
the law under a correctness standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). Under this 
standard, the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any way to the trial 
judge's determination of law. Id. (citing State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431,433 (Utah 1993)). 
Preservation of the issue: This issue was preserved by motion and the trial court's ruling. 
See Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner is currently awaiting trial on several counts of securities fraud and 
communications fraud arising from conduct occurring between October 1995 through December 
1996. Petitioner is not currently in custody. 
The State has charged Petitioner by an Amended Information with the following: 
Counts 1 through 3 and 8, Unlawful Dealing of Property by a Fiduciary, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-513 (1995); 
Counts 4 through 6, Securities Fraud, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1 (1983) and 
§61-1-21 (1997); 
Counts 9 through 15, Communications Fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1) (1995); and 
Count 16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
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Code Ann. §76-10-1603 (1987) and §76-10-1603.5 (1993). 
On April 30, 1998, a preliminary hearing was held in this matter. Petitioner was 
represented by private counsel. At the conclusion of the evidence, Counts 1, 2, 3, and 8 were 
dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner was bound over on Counts 9 through 15. Counts 4 through 
7 and 16 were taken under advisement by the court. On June 23, 1998, the court issued a minute 
entry binding Petitioner over on the remaining Counts 4 through 7 and 16. 
After Petitioner had been bound over and a jury trial scheduled, Petitioner's private 
counsel withdrew. Several months later, the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association was 
appointed to represent Petitioner. It was determined thereafter that the recording of the original 
preliminary hearing had been lost or destroyed and a transcript of that proceeding was therefore 
unavailable. Petitioner's counsel made a motion before the trial court for a new preliminary 
hearing since the recording/transcript of the original hearing was unavailable. After the issue 
was briefed and argued by both the state and Petitioner's counsel, the trial court denied 
Petitioner's motion. A copy of the motion hearing transcript is attached as Addendum B. 
Petitioner is now before this Court seeking permission to appeal the trial court's order. 
WHY AN IMMEDIATE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL SHOULD BE PERMITTED 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY DENYING 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR A NEW PRELIMINARY HEARING BECAUSE 
PETITIONER'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL IS JEOPARDIZED BY THE UNAVAILABILITY OF THE ORIGINAL 
PRELIMINARY HEARING RECORDING/TRANSCRIPT. 
This issue requires interlocutory review not only because it is an important issue of first 
impression in Utah, but also because of the overwhelming impact the denial of Petitioner's 
motion for a new preliminary hearing will have. The unavailability of the original preliminary 
hearing recording/transcript limits Petitioner's ability to prepare an adequate defense for his 
upcoming trial. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to a new preliminary hearing in this case and 
Petitioner's petition for an interlocutory appeal should be granted. 
The right to a preliminary hearing is guaranteed by Article I, §13 of the Utah 
Constitution. That section provides: "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate" (emphasis added). 
The primary function of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether probable cause 
exists to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused committed it. Utah Const, 
art. I, §12: see also State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986). Thus, it acts as a screening 
device to "ferret out . . . groundless and improvident prosecutions." Brickev, 714 P.2d at 646 
(quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980)). 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a preliminary hearing also serves 
other important purposes independent of the role it plays in establishing probable cause. A 
preliminary hearing acts as a discovery device advising the accused of the details of the charges 
against him and preserving favorable evidence. State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998). 
The Supreme Court has noted that the discovery available at a preliminary hearing is an 
important step in the preparation of an accused's defense for a subsequent trial. Anderson, 612 
P.2d at 784. In Anderson, the Supreme Court further noted that the opportunity to prepare an 
effective defense is recognized as essential to the preservation of the defendant's substantive 
right to a fair trial. Id. 
Although a preliminary hearing is not a "full blown determination of an accused's guilt or 
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innocence, it is nonetheless a 'critical stage' in the criminal process." State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 
860, 863 (Utah App. 1998); see also Brickev, 714 P.2d at 646. Since it is a critical stage in the 
criminal process, proper consideration for an accused's constitutional rights must be observed. 
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In this case, Petitioner will be denied the opportunity to adequately prepare a defense for 
his upcoming trial if his request for a new preliminary hearing is not granted. Petitioner has been 
charged with several counts of securities fraud and communications fraud, which involve 
technical, complex issues. While a preliminary hearing was held in this matter, Petitioner is 
denied the ancillary benefits of that hearing by the unavailability of the recording/transcript, 
thereby effectively denying him the full benefit of the protection guaranteed by Article 1, §13 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
Petitioner will be prejudiced if a new preliminary hearing is not held in this matter for 
several reasons. First, the original preliminary hearing was held over two years ago. It will be 
difficult to reconstruct what occurred at that hearing. Second, the attorney who represented 
Petitioner at his original preliminary hearing is no longer on the case. Petitioner's present 
counsel is at a disadvantage by not having participated in the original preliminary hearing. 
Third, Petitioner's present counsel has no way of ascertaining what testimony may be expected 
from the state's witnesses at trial because they are precluded from either listening to the original 
hearing or going back through the transcript. Moreover, the information contained in Petitioner's 
case file does not aid counsel in ascertaining what such testimony may be. While the Discovery 
in this case contains reams of documents and the preliminary hearing involved six different 
witnesses, only two witnesses' statements are in the Discovery and they appear to be duplicative. 
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A new preliminary hearing is necessary in order to organize the material and understand how the 
documents relate to the State's theory of the case. It will be time consuming and inefficient to 
require defense counsel to review the documents and guess at the State's theory. Although the 
State has offered to make the witnesses available by telephone, there is no substitute for 
recorded, under-oath testimony. Finally, Petitioner's present counsel is precluded from 
discovering testimony from the original preliminary hearing which may be favorable to 
Petitioner. Nor can counsel discover possibly contradictory statements made by the witnesses at 
the original preliminary hearing which would aid in impeaching their credibility at trial. Thus, 
Petitioner will be deprived of the right guaranteed by Article 1, §12 of the Utah Constitution to 
confront and effectively cross-examine the witnesses against him, as well as his Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 
This case can be distinguished from other cases which have dealt with the unavailability 
of a preliminary hearing transcript. First, in State v. Neelev. the Utah Supreme Court considered 
the issue of whether the defendants were entitled to a new trial due where portions of the 
preliminary hearing could not be transcribed due to a malfunction in the recording equipment. 
748 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Utah 1988). Defendants moved for a new preliminary hearing based on 
the lack of a complete transcript and their motion was denied. Id. 
The court began its analysis by recognizing that the preliminary hearing is an important 
step in the criminal process and that it serves both as a discovery device and a means to preserve 
evidence for trial. Id at 1095 (citing Anderson. 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980)). It also recognized a 
defendant's right to a transcript of the preliminary hearing upon timely request. Id. (citations 
omitted). The court held that while the failure to provide a complete transcript was error, it was 
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harmless since it did not prejudice the defendants. Id The error was harmless since it was 
apparent from the record that defense counsel was able to use the portion of the transcript that 
was available to thoroughly impeach the state's chief witness on cross examination at trial. Id. 
Neelev is distinguishable from this case. Here, unlike in Neelev, no transcript, not even a 
portion, has been provided to Petitioner. Although the extent to which the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing in Neelev was incomplete was not apparent from the record, id, the defense 
in Neelev had enough of the transcript to give it some idea as to what the state's chief witness 
would testify to, and to successfully impeach him. Id, Furthermore, the defendant in Neelev was 
charged with burglary, theft, and criminal trespass, id at 1092, which involve relatively simple 
issues. Here, Petitioner has been charged with securities fraud and communications fraud, which 
involve technical, complex issues. Moreover, the unavailability of the recording/transcript fails 
to comply with the requirement that when a defendant is bound over to the district court after 
preliminary hearing, all pleadings and records made of the proceedings before the magistrate 
must be transmitted to the clerk of the district court. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(j)(l). Petitioner will be 
prejudiced by the unavailability of the original preliminary hearing recording/transcript because 
defense counsel has nothing to go on, not even the benefit of having participated in the original 
preliminary hearing. 
The only other case which has dealt with this issue is Willett. 909 P.2d 218. There, the 
defendant claimed he was entitled to a new preliminary hearing or, in the alternative, the right to 
depose witnesses whose testimony was not transcribed or who did not testify at the preliminary 
hearing, when the transcript of the second day of the preliminary hearing was missing. Id at 
221. However, since the defendant failed to cite to the record in support of his argument for a 
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new preliminary hearing, the court refused to consider that issue. Id. at 221-22. Therefore, 
Willett has no bearing on this case. Moreover, unlike the defendant in Willett. Petitioner has no 
access to any part of the preliminary hearing transcript. 
This Court should grant Petitioner's petition to appeal the lower court's interlocutory 
order since the trial court committed prejudicial error by denying Petitioner's motion for a new 
preliminary hearing. Contrary to Utah Supreme Court precedent, the trial court failed to 
recognize that the preliminary hearing is an important discovery device. Furthermore, the trial 
court failed to recognize the rights guaranteed to Petitioner under Article 1, §§12 and 13 of the 
Utah Constitution. Petitioner will be prejudiced if a new preliminary hearing is not held because 
the unavailability of the original preliminary hearing recording/transcript limits his preparation of 
an adequate defense to the charges against him. Therefore, this Court should grant Petitioner's 
petition for interlocutory review and grant Petitioner's request for a new preliminary hearing. 
WHY AN APPEAL MAY MATERIALLY ADVANCE TERMINATION OF 
LITIGATION 
An immediate appeal in this case will materially advance termination of the litigation 
because consideration of the issue at this point in the process may avoid a new trial later. If 
Petitioner is convicted at trial without the benefit of a new preliminary hearing, appeals this issue 
after conviction, and prevails, then a new trial will likely be held. Moreover, assuming this 
Court hears this issue and grants a new preliminary hearing, the fair administration of justice will 
be served by giving Petitioner the tools necessary to prepare an adequate defense. 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant his petition for interlocutory review 
and review the issue addressed herein. 
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